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This paper attempts to identify the major determinants of the unfunded liability for state and local public 
defined benefit (DB) pension plans across the United States (U.S.) State and local pension plans are 
required to fulfill a commitment to pay lifetime pension benefits to its retirees. As the dependent variable, 
the unfunded liability (UL) within each state plan is analyzed to determine which financial lever emerges 
as the dominant force to help close the funding gap. Source data consists of 16 years (2003-2018) of Plan 
Data derived from the Public Plan Data (PPD) gathered by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College (CRR) and the Center for State and Local Government Excellence (SLGE). Annual State 
Government Finances Tables published by the U.S. Census Bureau were also used to review state 
expenditures and revenues to include 1) Bureau of Economic Analysis/Real Gross Product Annual by 
State and 2) Trading Economics/U.S. GDP per capita. I apply a multiple linear regression empirical 
model of panel data with both cross-section and period factors fixed with robust standard errors.  My 
findings show that the UL held a strong negative correlation to the discount rate, investment allocation, 
and the average 10-year investment returns. Model results also revealed that as the annual required 
employer contribution or the tax revenue per capita increases, the UL also increases. These results help to 
provide solutions on how certain financial measures can help reduce the unfunded liability gap (ULG) 
within state public DB pension plans across the U.S. 
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Introduction   
The main purpose of this study is to identify the key determinants of the unfunded liability (UL) for state 
and local public Defined Benefit (DB) pension plans. The UL is a measure of pension debt in plans across 
the U.S. This debt continues to rise while pension obligations to current and future retirees must also be 
satisfied. The UL is derived by subtracting the market value of plan assets from its accrued liabilities. If 
assets are less than liabilities, it signals a lack of funds set aside to cover all pension benefits and 
generates what is known as an unfunded liability on the financial books of many states across the country. 
If assets exceed liabilities, a plan is considered fully funded. The pension and employee benefits 
committee noted that full funding does not usually imply that the pension plan has sufficient assets to 
cover its solvency liabilities (unless the funding objective is to achieve a solvency level of 
funding.)1  Throughout my manuscript, I will refer to the unfunded liability (UL) as the actual accrued 
liability and refer to the unfunded liability gap (ULG) as an expression of the financial factors that could 
help to reduce the liability.  The contributing factors to receive a DB pension benefit, involves a 
combination of both the plan design and fiscal health of pension plans. Plan design can range from 
elements of retirement requirements such as age, years of service, average salary, service credits, 
mandatory employee contributions, while fiscal health includes parameters that measure the financial 
impact of the pension liability. Examples include and not limited to, employers’ contributions, tax 
revenue per capita, Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP) per capita, budget surplus, discount rates and 
other investment measures.  
Napoletoano and Schmidt (2021) highlights that retirement is a major concern that individuals have 
around their finances and points to the 2019 survey by the Aegon Center for Longevity that shows almost 
half of Americans worry that they will outlive their savings and are also concerned that their investments 
will not provide the returns needed to live comfortably in retirement. According to the survey, only 32 
percent (global 25 percent) feel they are on track to achieve 67% of replacement income in retirement2  
To be well-situated and obtain financial freedom during retirement years, workers may choose to 
participate in either a defined contribution (DC) plan, or their employer may provide a DB plan. The 
choice of plan can depend on whether the employer is a private or public entity. Throughout this analysis, 
a public employer is defined as a state or an agency within the state, a city, county, township, school 
district, or a public institution of higher education. A private employer refers to an employer that is not 
                                                          
1  Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding and the Role of Actuaries Educational Monograph, May 2018. 
2 The Aegon Retirement Readiness Survey is conducted annually in collaboration with nonprofits Transamerica Center for 
Retirement Studies® in the United States and Instituto de Longevidade Mongeral Aegon in Brazil. 
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the state or any political subdivision, municipality, or other public agency of the state.3  This report will 
draw attention to the defined benefit plans across the U.S. in the public sector. 
To help better understand the impact of the pension liability within the United States. It is important to 
become acquainted with the recent retirement asset landscape as shown in Table 1 below. According to 
the Investment Institute Research Fourth Quarter 2019 year-end report, $32.3 trillion in total retirement 
assets of which, $6.7 trillion (21%) represent defined benefits plans that include federal, state and local 
plans and $3.4 trillion (11%) represent private sector defined benefit plans. The defined contribution 
landscape represents $9.0 trillion or 28% of total assets ($6.2 trillion represent private DC plans and $2.7 
trillion represent 403(b) and 457 plans.) State and local government pension benefits are paid from trust 
funds to which public employees and their employers contributed while they were working (PPD 
database, 2019). The assets within the trust fund are expected to grow over time and are used for funding 
a lifelong pension obligation for current and future retirees. The assets are measured against the pension 
liabilities to determine whether a plan is unfunded (lower assets than liabilities) or fully funded (higher 
assets than liabilities). The relationship between financial factors (such as projected contributions, 
economic measures, portfolio allocation and investment returns) and the UL are observed throughout this 
paper. 
The defined benefit (DB) obligation in the public sector represents a mathematical calculation of an 
estimated percentage of base salary and a monthly annual plan benefit. This benefit commonly includes 
three key components for normal retirement such as age, salary, and length of service (Ashford and 
Schmidt, 2021).  For example, the State of Connecticut’s Teachers Retirement Board estimator of benefits 
includes several factors such as age at retirement, number of years worked, (i.e., credited service) and 
three highest salary years (Appendix, Table 2). Many private companies have shifted from DB to DC 
plans to transfer the risks from the employer to the employee (Broadhurst, Palumbo and Woodman, 
2006).  The rationale for this change by many private firms has been due to a few key and notable facts 
such as the elimination of the future pension liability owed to plan participants, tax benefits, lower plan 
administration expenses and employers no longer responsible for the investment performance of the plan. 
The employee bears the financial risk of participating in a DC plan where the amount of savings at 
retirement is determined by factors such as age, time horizon, and most importantly, the contribution 
amount and investments selected. For DB plans, the employer bears the investment risk that returns on 
assets may fall short of the growth of the pension liability. Longevity risk is another risk that employers 
may realize because they are obligated to offer DB benefits as a deferred lifetime annuity. As 
                                                          
3 Wage and Hour Division, an agency within the U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210, www.dol.gov, 2020. 
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beneficiaries of DB plans now live longer, it will also extend the benefit payment timeline. Therefore, it is 
impossible to ignore DB plans in the public sector where states (the employer) and ultimately taxpayers 
across the U.S. continue to bear the risk on behalf of the state and local employees.  
TABLE 1 
 
U.S. RETIREMENT MARKET ASSETS4 
$32.3T 
December 31, 2019 
 
Type of Plan 
 
Type of Entity 
 
Plan Contributions Who Bears Most? 
 Risk? 
How is the monthly 
 benefit determined? 
DB Defined Benefit 
$10T5 




Employer Benefit is calculated in advance: based on the 
employee’s years of service, age, salary etc. 
DC Defined Contribution 
$9T6 




Employee Benefit is undefined and controlled by the 
employee factors such age, time horizon, amount 








Investor Benefit is undefined and controlled by the 
investor factors such age, time horizon, 
amount contribution and funds selected 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Retirement income can be generated from a variety of sources such as a pension or annuity, personal 
savings, investments (i.e., CDs, bonds, mutual funds, stocks and real estate holdings, etc.) and Social 
Security benefits.8  Social Security is a major source of retirement income for those wage earners that are 
covered employees and according to the Social Security Administration (SSA), 89 percent of U.S. 
workers ages 21 to 64 are in "covered" employment. There are some groups that are considered “non-
covered” employees and in many cases, these employees will be granted a state pension plan rather than 
Social Security. Non-covered employees may include teachers, U.S. government employees hired before 
1984, railroad employees covered by a separate pension and foreign nationals who work in the U.S. for 
their home government.9 The livelihood and employee benefit expectations of the worker were seriously 
impacted within both the private and public sector. In fact, the 1980s brought a drastic shift to the 
traditional employer/employee relationship with employers using layoffs to maximize profits.  Although 
                                                          
4 Investment Institute Research Fourth Quarter 2019 
5 Defined Benefit plan provide a fixed, pre-established benefit for employees at retirement, IRS.gov, 2021. 
6 Defined Contribution plan is a retirement plan in which the employee and/or employer contribute to the employees individual 
account under the plan, IRS.gov, 2021 
7A Traditional IRA is a tax-advantaged personal savings plan where contributions may be tax deductible, IRS gov, 2021. 
8The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is a nongovernmental organization that writes and enforces rules for 
brokers and broker-dealers, Finra.org, Sources of Retirement Income, 2021. 
9 Formerly called the American Association of Retired Persons, AARP Social Security Resource Center, is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan organization that empowers people to choose how they live as they age, https://www.aarp.org/retirement/social-
security/questions-answers/benefits/. 
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public sector workers were impacted to a lesser degree, there is no doubt that state and local entities 
(including teachers and schools) have been impacted by the changing socio-economic times with 
increasing occurrences of job eliminations and school closings. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), the median tenure of workers ages 45 to 54 is 7.5 years in 2020 as compared to 8.4 years 
in January 1981.10 
Employer and/or employee contributions made into some type of employer-sponsored retirement plan are 
needed to help satisfy income for a retiree’s lifetime. The employer makes most contributions to a DB 
plan however, employee contributions can be required, or voluntary contributions may be permitted. For 
DC plans, the employees can choose to voluntarily contribute to their retirement plan up to a certain limit 
(401k plans).  Their employers can choose to match employee contributions with additional funds or 
choose to make elective contributions irrespective of the amount contributed by the employee (Enright, 
2021). 
According to the aggregated state and local pension DB plans across the U.S. from 2003-2018, adjusted 
PPD data increased the unfunded liability to $1.43 trillion in 2018 from $1.40 trillion in 2017 (Fig. 1). 
The UL is designated as the key dependent variable; and multiple independent variables are measured to 
determine the relationship between the unfunded liability across all 50 states. Independent variables 
represent annual plan contributions, tax revenue, budget surplus, GDP per capita, discount rates and 
others were tested against the UL. There is much discussion around whether carrying an unfunded 
pension liability impedes a public employer’s (i.e., state or employer) ability to continue to pay millions 
of current and future retirees their respective pension benefits. One position claim that having an 
outstanding UL does not result in a state’s incapability to fund its pension plan (Florida Public Pension 
Trustees Association, FPPTA, 2011). The opposing position states that being underfunded11 is a 
hindrance and could have a negative long-term impact on the state’s pension obligation (Novy-Marx and 
Rauh, 2009.)   
           
 
  
                                                          
10 State and Local Governments Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). U.S Department of Wage and Labor division, 
March 2011. 
11 According to the Florida Public Pension Trustees Association (FPPTA), “Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded 
Liability.” The term “underfunded” means that the plan sponsor has not made sufficient contributions to fund the present and 
future liabilities of promised benefits. 
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Brief History  
 
Pensions initially served as extra compensation to persuade people to enlist into the military (Longley, 
2020). The first pension law was enacted during the Revolutionary War, and initially, states were 
responsible for making payments and many were faced with budget challenges. In 1789, legislation was 
passed where the U.S. government assumed full responsibility for making the pension payments to 
disabled veterans. The federal government passed additional legislation increasing benefits for veterans 
and their families as the country grew ever more prosperous. In 1818, benefits were expanded to all 
veterans for life instead of a few years. In 1875, The American Express Company was the first private 
company to offer a DB pension plan to help fulfill the need for lifetime retirement income. The plan was 
offered during the Reconstruction era to workers who were 60 years of age, had a tenure of 20 years and 
were directed to retire by a manager (Phipps, 2021). Twenty years later, public non-military plans were 
offered, and the Chicago Teacher’s plan became one of the oldest non-military public plans with an 
inception date of 1895. The state of Illinois along with several plans within CA, MA, MN, NY, and PA 
were established during the Progressive era which took place during the 1890s to 1920s (Longley, 2020). 
 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)12 was put in place to establish a 
regulatory framework for private DC and DB plans. These private pension plans provided financial 
support in the retirement years for many Americans and ERISA was Congress’s attempt to devise a 
comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of Americans (Wooten, 2004). ERISA plans must 
also adhere to Department of Labor regulations under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act. ERISA rules help mitigate certain risks for private DB plans such as agency risk, forfeiture risk and 
default risk (Wooten 2004). Agency risk is the risk that the employer might misuse assets and not have 
enough to meet their pension obligation.  Forfeiture risk is the risk that employees could lose their 
pension benefit due to layoff or job change. Default risk is the risk that the plan could become insolvent 
and be unable to fulfill its financial commitment. These key risks currently exist in the public pension 
world today. However, mitigation of these risks in the private sector includes but are not limited to: 
 
• Fiduciary standards of conduct, minimum vesting, and funding standards for employers. 
• Employers are required to set up separate financial resources to help meet their obligation. 
                                                          
12 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is a federal law that sets minimum standards for most 
voluntarily established retirement and health plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these plans, 
Employee Benefits Security Administration, an agency within the U.S. Department of Labor. 
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• Participation in a federal program (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation – PBGC) that pays 
vested pension benefits in the event of plan termination in the private sector DB plans.13 
 
Public DB plans (non-ERISA plans) are not required to follow ERISA standards. For example, no 
insurance (PBGC) exists for public employees. Therefore, should a gap in funding the liability exists, the 
state and/or municipality should reassess their budgets to find ways to cover the shortfall. My findings 
reveal that an increase in annual required contributions (ARC) would not necessarily decrease the 
unfunded liability but would increase the dependent variable. Although this was an unforeseen finding, 
there is no mandate for public state plans to make timely contributions. In fact, the ARC is perceived to 
be an optional or suggested payment by public DB plan administrators and not truly as a required annual 
payment. There is no mandate for public state plans to make timely contributions at all. This is 
remarkably similar to how households manage their day-to-day budget. Individuals choose to determine 
the amount, timing, and frequency of their respective bill payments. Inconsistent behavior may result in 
consequences such as fee penalties, higher interest rates and a reduced credit score. Similarly, state, and 
public employees can skip making their share of contributions. The expectations of employees do vary 
from state to state and there are situations where employee contributions are either voluntary or 
mandatory. As the normal cost of benefits for each member continues to be accrued, a continual pattern of 
nonpayment and/or erratic payments would cause an increase in the unfunded liability.  
As a former investment consultant who acted on behalf of insurance company retirement providers for 
many years, I have witnessed public pension administrators throughout the U.S. who were called upon to 
make key decisions for both Defined Contribution (DC) and Defined Benefit (DB) retirement plans. 
These key overseers usually consist of several board members that hold roles such as Human Resource 
Directors, Finance Directors and Chief Financial Officers (CFO). It is also common for board members to 
gain membership through appointment. the board representatives have an important responsibility to 
partner with a provider of retirement services (i.e., insurance companies, investment consultants, 
brokerage firms and mutual fund companies) as well as an actuarial firm to make key investment 
decisions for thousands of employees. Most boards follow the guidance of an investment policy statement 
(IPS) which outlines parameters around investment selection and the addition and removal of investments 
for DC and DB plans. This process is in place to ensure that retirement plans are properly positioned to 
meet their future pension obligations as employees retire from their employer. DB plans take a similar 
approach as their DC counterparts in that both strategies seek to find the best asset allocation to achieve 
                                                          
13 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, A U.S Government Agency, updated March 2021, 
https://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/pg/general-faqs-about-pbgc. 
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the most efficient return. Public and private entities must follow the standards and the plan reporting 
requirements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The objective of FASB and the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is for plans to report benefit obligations and pension 
fund assets in a uniform manner.14 
Literature Review and Motivation  
As the industry examines the plan design and financial health of public pension plans, notable statistics 
studied by actuaries, pension administration, consultants and other industry experts were prevalent in the 
pension liability conversation. Antolin (2008) in collaboration with other private institutions assessed 
performance by country on a risk-adjusted basis using relatively standard investment performance 
measures. Additionally, the relationships between the characteristics of each pension system were 
examined including individual regulatory environments and the investment performance. Antolin 
highlights a few challenges and limitations with reporting and analyzing numbers by country such as the 
validity of the risk-adjusted measure Sharpe ratio and the use of artificially constructed country-specific 
benchmarks for a large variety of pension plans across the countries (not necessarily the same). His 
analysis included both DC and DB private plans and lacked attention on public pension plans. Another 
noteworthy study by Beshears, Liabson and Madrian (2011) finds that replacement income within the 
public sector varies greatly across jurisdictions. Though a reduction of the unfunded pension liability was 
not of emphasis, they specified that the shift from DB to DC plan offering would result in the need for 
participants to save more in other retirement accounts. The authors also make a distinction on how public 
sector and primary DC plans are characterized by required employee or employer contributions vs. 
employee voluntary contributions within the private sector. Their research concludes by applying lessons 
from savings behavior in private sector savings plans to the design of public sector plans.  
Budget Stabilization Funds (BSFs) for public defined benefit plans are reserves set aside to protect the 
state budget from cyclical changes in revenue and expenses. Clairs (2013) analyzed deposit and 
withdrawal activity and its link to the employer contribution. His empirical results suggest that BSFs with 
strict deposit rules are associated with higher pension contributions, while strict withdrawal rules are 
associated with lower contributions. The connection discovered between the BSF, and pension 
contributions aided in my decision to select employer contributions as a primary independent variable and 
compared to the unfunded liability.  
                                                          
14 The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the independent, private- sector organization based in Norwalk, 
Connecticut, which establishes accounting and financial reporting standards for U.S. state and local governments that follow 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), September 2021. 
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Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) explores the true funding status of public pension plans across the U.S. and, 
at times, question the usefulness and loosely reported pension liability. According to Novy-Marx and 
Rauh (2009), each state plan reports only one actuarial number for its pension liability. They suggest that, 
at a minimum, states should be required to report liabilities under several pre-specified discount rates, 
such as Treasury interest rates and interest rates on taxable municipal bonds. The impact of discount rates 
on the unfunded liability was not explored in this manuscript. Other non-academic writings including 
Mohan and Zhang’s (2011) from University of Dayton School of Business, the authors studied 
determinants of public pension plan risk-taking behavior using the percentage of total plan assets invested 
in the equity markets and the pension asset beta as measures of investment risk. They found that 
government accounting standards strongly affect public fund investment risk, as higher return 
assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and beta. 
The link between whether a link exists between discount rates and the unfunded liability will be explored 
in this paper. 
The condensed report (PEW and the Arnold Foundation, 2014) highlights that, up through 2012, pension 
plans progressed from fixed income to an increased investment in equities and alternative funds. The 
report also suggests that such changes come with increased costs and uncertainty around the future 
realized returns. The assumed rate of return was compared to the 30-year Treasury bond. It was noted 
that, between 1992 and 2012, the difference between the assumed rate of return and the yield on 30-Year 
Treasury Bonds has increased from .33 percentage points to 4.83 percentage points. This brief and high-
level analysis alluded to the fact that there has been a shift to riskier investment allocations through 2012. 
To further this study research, my review will include the investment allocation by state level to 
determine whether a shift to equity and alternative investments continue to exist.  
The Annual Required Contribution  
The annual required contribution (ARC) is a principal factor when determining the true cost of the 
pension plan.15  The annual required contribution reflects the employer's contribution as reported in the 
required supplementary tables for GASB accounting purposes. There are three main elements that 
comprise the total expected contribution such as the employer normal cost amount, amortization of the 
UL, other expenses (retirement, medical and administrative) and interest expense on the prior year’s 
pension obligation. The annual required contribution is guided by General Accepted Standards Board 
(GASB) statements 67 and 68 in the U.S. and there are factors (investment return assumptions, 
                                                          
15 ” Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded Liability,” Florida Public Pension Trustees Association 
(FPPTA), p. 4. 
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amortization methods, funding policies and timing of payments) that differ from plan to plan and can 
impact its calculation16. 
One may presume the ARC is a requirement for DB public plans because it is described as ‘required,’ 
however, it is generally known that there is an expectation for payment to be made versus a requirement 
that it must be made. As an important distinction, this optional approach has resulted in partial 
contributions to fund present and future liabilities or skipped contributions for several years. Although 
making a payment should normally reduce the rate of indebtedness, it can actually increase the rate since; 
1) the cost of the plan administration continues to be charged to the debt and 2) interest on the unfunded 
liability continues to be applied. If a public plan chooses not to make the full ARC payment on an annual 
basis and either makes partial payments, no payments or pays erratically, the clock will continue to tick 
and increase the liability/debt of the total plan.  
The ARC calculation is an annual snapshot in time of the DB plan. If the plan sponsor does not pay its 
ARC in full every year, no amount of payment (unless it is in full) will stop the unfunded liability from 
continuing to increase. Like the private sector DB plans of old, an ERISA-like requirement must be 
passed where all plans must pay their ARC into their plan every year. This is the one of the ways plans 
public DB plans will have hope of funding the promise made to their employees.  
As discussed earlier, private DB plans adhere to regulatory rules of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA). Additionally, the extension of ERISA, known as the Pension Protection Act (PPA) 
of 2006 requires private plans to become 100% funded over time and to adhere to financial assumptions 
that pension plans must fund objectives. These measures were established to ensure that minimum 
contributions are made to satisfy the annual contribution expectation. A more recent change to single 
employer private DB plans is the calculation for discounting interest rates. In response to a period of low 
interest rates, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), established a process for 
determining minimum and maximum interest rates for discounting based on 25-year averages of historical 
corporate bond yields (Topoleski and Myers, 2020.) This act suggests that a lower interest rate would 
result in a lower assumed investment return and/or more realistic present value of future payments for 
employers to meet their pension obligations. As originally established, the funding corridor was 
                                                          
16 Established in 1984, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the independent, private- sector organization 
based in Norwalk, Connecticut, which establishes accounting and financial reporting standards for U.S. state and local 
governments that follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), https://www.gasb.org/aboutgasb. 
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scheduled to widen eventually, which, when applied to the specified interest rates, would have 
resulted in the use of lower interest rates to calculate private DB pension obligations. 
Data and Methodology 
The Public Plans Data (PPD), United States Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) were the four main data sources needed to analyze the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable by state.  
The PPD was the leading data used and comprised of annual information on the largest state/local pension 
plans in the U.S. The data is produced by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR) 
and the Center for State and Local Government Excellence (SLGE) represented over 3,700 observations 
from 2001-2018 across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Plan data does not track federal 
employee retirement plans and therefore those plan types were not included in this analysis. Key pension 
plan data included assets, funding, investments, other vital metrics, and membership within each state 
across the U.S. In fact, data was available for multiple plans within each state from 2001-2018. To obtain 
a balanced data set, where each plan is observed during the same time-period, 2001 and 2002 data were 
excluded. A full comprehensive sample of data representing 2003-2018 was analyzed. All 50 states were 
represented, and the federal District of Columbia was excluded because 16 years of plan data were not 
reported. Data for 2019, was not yet complete and hence 2003 through 2018 represented 2,800 
observations. On average there were approximately 3.5 public retirement plans per state (including plans 
for teachers, municipalities, state workers etc.) One plan was assessed for Hawaii, Idaho Mississippi, 
Oregon, and Wyoming. California and Texas represented the highest number with 15 and 10 public plans, 
respectively. Data from the plans’ financial documents at times were used to highlight plan facts. The 
PPD consists of public pension plans aggregated across all states and reflects significant variations in plan 
benefit design, plan funding, membership composition, and investment strategies. It is an appropriate 
starting position to analyze the plan results at the macro state level. Disaggregation could be a suitable 
next step for future research (PPD database, 2019). Each state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita was used to determine its relationship with the unfunded liability. The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis was the main source for the annual Real GDP and the United States Census Bureau was used to 
determine the per capita numbers by state for GDP and tax revenue measures. Additionally, both sources 
were also used to assess the states’ budget/ deficit/surplus in two ways, (GDP/per capita and GDP/per 
state). The budget deficit/surplus by each state was reviewed to determine its relationship against the UL. 
The U.S. Census Bureau Annual Survey of State Government Finances Tables were used to provide both 
the revenue and expense data to calculate the budget deficit or surplus per GDP/state and GDP/per capita. 




The multiple ordinary least squares linear regression model was selected because it is one of the best 
models to assess the strength of the relationship between the unfunded liability (dependent variable) 
represent by RUFL and fifteen predictor variables (independent variables) across the US. Independent 
variables include, expected contributions, economic methods (i.e., tax revenue and budgets) and 
investment strategy (assumed investment returns, actual returns, and portfolio mix).  





RUFL= is the dependent variable -referred to as return on unfunded liability [unfunded liability as a % of assets] 
ARCR_ERiti =Employers projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll) 
ARCRit  =[Employer + Employee] projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll) 
TAXRPCit =Tax revenue per capita 
GPERCit =Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP) divided by Per Capita= [Real GDP by State/Per Capita] 
BUDGDPit =Total Revenues (TR) less Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per State= [TR-TL/GDP] 
BUDPCit =Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per Capita = [TR-TL/GDP Per Capita] 
DISCRit =Assumed Discount Rate used to value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by 
estimating expected rates of return.  
PTRTN= Portfolio Return is the overall return of each plan includes various asset allocations 
EQRTN= Equity Investment Return 
FIRTN= Fixed Income Investment Return 
A3YR= Average 3-Yr Investment Return 
A5YR= Average 5-Yr Investment Return  
A10YR= Average 10-Yr Investment Return 
EQALL= Equity Asset Allocation Mix 
FIALL= Fixed Income Allocation Mix 
 
  




Multiple Linear Regression Model  
Table 3 below shows the structure of the multiple linear regression model. The dependent variable is 
equal to the accrued liability minus actuarial assets and expressed as a % of assets (RUFL). The 
independent variables, mapped in three main categories such as expected contributions, economic 
methods, and investment strategies. The investment strategy category has been further divided into three 
separate groups to highlight a few differences between assumed returns, actual returns, and portfolio mix. 
As a result, five groups of independent variables were formed and analyzed.  
Each group were identified as balanced or unbalanced. Balanced data shows that every cross-section 
follows same regular frequency, with the same start and end dates. For example, the balanced data 
consists of 150 cross sections in the main model with annual data from 2003-2018. The unbalanced data 
represent irregular or unreported data. For instance, the Atlanta General Employee Pension Fund showed 
missing data for portfolio returns for 2018. Overall, there were 1,442 unbalanced observations in group 4 
while group 5 revealed 2,302 observations. 
Table 3 shows the expected payment known as Annual Required Contribution (ARC) is the main 
independent variable and placed in Group 1. The “ARCR_ER” solely represents the employer 
contribution and expressed as projected actuarial required contribution (ARC_ER rate as a percentage of 
payroll) as shown on Fig. 4. The second variable in Group 1, identified as ARCR represent a combination 
of both employee and employer contribution. This method was employed to determine whether the 
ARCR_ER would act differently if an employee contribution were included in the payment. Group 2 
represents other key economic measures such as tax revenue per capita, GDP per capita, budget per capita 
and budget as a percentage of GDP. Group 3 include an assumed investment return (discount rate) as a 
solo variable. Group 4 illustrates average 3-year, 5-year, and 10- year rates of return as well as portfolio 
investment returns. Finally, group 5 represents the portfolio mix allocations (i.e., equity vs. fixed 
income).  
  

























































Other factors I= cross plan id 
t= year 
All Preliminary Variables Tested and Explained 
Table 3 list the dependent and all independent variables initially assessed throughout the analysis; represents the aggregate of all plans by state from 
2003-2018 
1Employers projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll) 
2Total [Employer + Employee] projected actuarial required contribution (ARC rate as a % of payroll) 
3Tax revenue per capita 
4Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP) divided by Per Capita= [Real GDP by State/Per Capita] 
5Total Revenues (TR) less Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per State= [TR-TL/GDP] 
6Total Expenditures (TE) divided by GDP per Capita = [TR-TL/GDP Per Capita] 
7Assumed Discount Rate used to value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by estimating expected rates of return.  
8PTRTN= Portfolio Return is the overall return of each plan include various asset allocations. 
9EQRTN= Equity Investment Return 
10FIRTN= Fixed Income Investment Return 
11A3YR= Average 3-Yr Investment Return 
12A5YR= Average 5-Yr Investment Return  
13A10YR= Average 10-Yr Investment Return 
14EQALL= Equity Allocation Mix 
15FIALL= Fixed Income Allocation Mix 
 




Model Results  
 Results are described by each type of financial measure such as contributions, economic levers, 
and investment strategy. Counterintuitive results for both determinant variables (ARC and tax 
revenue per capita variables) were observed. There was an expectation for the UL to decrease as 
these variables increased. However, results show that a 1% increase in the ARC by the employer 
or tax revenue will increase the UL. The multiple linear regression shows three independent 
variables that emerged as highly statistically significant: a) annual employer contribution rate 
(ARC_ER), b) tax revenue per capita and c) equity allocation mix. The results of the 15-variable 
linear regression are shown on Table 3A in five groups. Those variables that were not 
statistically significant were removed and the model was condensed from five groups to two 
groups (Group 1 balanced and Group 2 unbalanced). The results are shown on Table 3B. Fig. 1, 
displays the total aggregated unfunded liability which is the dependent variable as the total value 
vs. the unfunded liability as a percentage of assets from 2003-2018. The panel model was 
adjusted to reflect only those plans that showed data in each year from 2003-2018. 
Model Results-Contributions 
A 1% increase in the ARC_ER (expressed as a percentage of payroll) will increase the unfunded liability 
(expressed as a percentage of assets) at 2.0% (Table 3A and 3B). For example, if the 2018 employer 
required annual contribution for California Public Employees Retirement Fund (California PERF) 
increased by 1% from $19.90B to $20.10B, the unfunded liability will rise from $150.40B to $153.41B.17   
Findings show that a slight increase to ARC_ER may not cause a reduction but an increase to the UL. 
One may suggest that the rate of indebtedness should be reduced by solely making a payment however, 
the results show that the rate can actually increase. This increase could happen as a result of plan 
administration costs and the interest charged on the unfunded liability as time moves forward. A key 
learning is that the ARC calculation determined by actuaries is an “expected” contribution, not a required 
contribution for public pension plans. Some states have a policy that requires payment of the ARC, 
                                                          
17 Public Plan Database (PPD) (2019) Public plans data. Available at https://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database, Google 
Scholar. Adjusted calculations were used to determine the impact to the unfunded liability. 
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however other factors can affect those policies and the actual payment of the ARC. For example, 
in New Jersey, two separate legal rulings found that the state’s ARC requirement, set in statute, 
did not constitute a “self-executing appropriation” (Brainard and Brown, 2015). Therefore, should 
a public plan choose not to make the full ARC payment on an annual basis or make partial payments, no 
payments or pays erratically, the debt or liability will continue to increase. This behavior can be 
compared to the process of making of credit card payments, for example, if a minimum payment is made 
on a $500 outstanding balance, the minimum payment gets absorbed by the huge interest rate that is 
continued to be charged, in addition the annual credit card fee must be paid. 
The public pension plan itself does not stay static, there are long-time employees who were eligible for a 
defined benefit pension now retiring and receiving payouts that must be funded on an annual basis. At the 
same time, new employees are being hired (and not all are necessarily in their 20s or 30s), and therefore 
new retirees add to the unfunded liability calculation, thus also inflating the debt or liability of the plan. 
The current approach gives a plan complete freedom to choose whether to contribute the full expected 
contribution amount, to make a partial payment of that expected amount or to decline to contribute at all. 
I decided to further assess the model with a one-year lag to determine whether year 1 ARC_ER would 
help impact funding in year 2. Table 4A results showed an increase to the liability where the rate shifted 
from 2.0% without a lag to 1.9% with a one-year lag. Results were and is highly statistically significant. 
A further reduction is shown in year 2 at 1.8%. As an example, if we apply the ARCR_ER rate of 
reduction to the California PERF plan, the UL will rise to $153.39B with a one-year lag and $153.09B 
with a two-year lag. Overall, both the first- and second-year lag shows statistically significant results and 
reveals that the impact of a reduction may take a few years. It is important to note that results show that 
the UL begins to slightly reduce at .52% when employee contribution is included with the employer 
contribution [ARCR]. Table 3B and 3C shows that this reduction occurs without any lags. 
 Model Results-Economic Levers 
As the tax revenue per capita increases by 1%, the UL will increase by more than 1% (Table 3B). State 
and local government pension benefits are paid from trust funds to which public employees and their 
employers contributed while they were working, not from general operating revenues. Trust fund assets 
are invested and grow over time18. Tax revenues are another sourcing option for state public pension 
plans, to help fund their obligations. However, unlike private plans, there are no minimum funding 
                                                          
18 Public Plan Database (PPD) (2019). Available at https://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database, Google Scholar. 
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requirements for the UL and therefore the independent variable is likely to continue to increase should the 
plan decide against using tax revenues to make payment towards the annual contribution. A possible 
solution is to mandate a certain percentage of state tax revenue should be used to fund the pension trust 
obligation.  Bagchi examined the effects of political competition on the generosity of public sector 
pension plans and finds that as the level of political competition in a municipality increases, pension plans 
become more generous, and plans may not fully fund their plans to keep taxes low (Bagchi, 2019). In a 
more recent example, due to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, many states' tax revenues were 
reduced, and those that use tax revenue to help pay for the unfunded liability chose to either skip payment 
or make a partial payment toward their pension contribution. Others were waiting to see what amount of 
assistance would arrive from the federal government. California canceled $500 million from a $3 billion 
payment authorized in 2019 to pay down unfunded pension liabilities through fiscal 2023 and redirected 
$2.4 billion remaining from the initial allocation to instead pay pension contributions owed by school 
districts and community colleges 19. Tax revenues showed counterintuitive results and are another 
sourcing option for state public pension plans, to help fund their obligations. As tax revenues increase by 
1%, the UL is likely to continue to increase if the plan decides against using tax revenues to make 
payment towards the annual contribution. Table 4A shows that, at a 1% rate increase in tax revenue per 
capita with a lag of two-year will create a substantial increase the UL from 1% to 7%. The results clearly 
show that until public plans are required to use tax revenue dollars to pay down on the UL the liability, 
the debt will continue to increase even further in the second year. The second-year lag results show less 
than a 10% risk that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis which states that no 
relationship exists between state pension plans and the tax revenue per capita. 
 Model Results-Investment Strategy 
The investment strategy involves several levels of assessment. To reduce pension debt, a higher market 
value of plan assets must be achieved to cover the cost of current and future liabilities. Results show that 
when the portion allocated to investment in companies (expressed as EQALL) increases by 1%, the UL is 
reduced by .18% (Table 3B). While some data is unbalanced, the equity mix represent 1,520 records and 
generates a mean of 52%, median 55% and standard deviation of 10.8%. The one-year and two-year lags 
for equity allocation continue to show a reduction in the UL at around .17% and .28% respectively, with 
strong results particularly in the second year (Table 4A). These statistics reveal that public defined benefit 
                                                          
19 How Pandemic-Driven Revenue Shortfalls Could Affect State Pension Contributions, Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 
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plans have shifted from the assumption that fixed income represents the larger percentage of the 
investment mix (PEW and the Arnold Foundation, 2014). Excluding 2008, assets were also allocated to 
real estate, alternatives, private equities, commodities, and cash. The 2008 allocation shows that the 
financial crisis has certainly impacted the allocation mix selection of many of the public pension plans 
across the United States. Fig. 5, illustrates the trend of both equity and fixed allocation aggregated by all 
plans used in dataset over the 16-year testing period. Though the fixed income allocation mix was not 
significant, the investment results for conservative investments (bonds, certificate of deposits etc.), and 
the 10-year average returns were all statistically significant. A 1% increase to the fixed income return 
would increase the UL by .27% (Table 3B). This could occur if returns generated from stable assets do 
not cover the outstanding liabilities between 2003-2018. While Table 3A shows a 1% increase to the 
equity return portfolio will reduce the UL by a minute percentage, the results were not significant. The 
reduction to the UL does occur however, with an increase in the 10-year investment returns. The longer-
term return (average 10-year) is an essential factor to help close the ULG. As the 10-year return increases 
by 1%, the unfunded liabilities would reduce by 2.6%, results were highly statistically significant (Table 
3B). The one-year lag result for the 10- year return is also highly statistically significant and shows a 
3.0% reduction in the UL (Table 4A). These results tell us that the investment strategy of developing the 
right mix of equities and fixed income investments could overtime provide the returns needed to help 
reduce the UL. Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of the average 10-year return of all aggregated plans used in the 
dataset from 2003-2018. Note that 2004 shows the highest average 10-year return of 9.7% vs. 2009 and 
2010 lower returns of 3.1% and 3.5%. 
Fig. 6, shows both equity and fixed returns aggregated by all plans used in the dataset over the 16-year 
testing period. It is important to observe that twelve out of sixteen years (75% of the time), higher equity 
returns were generated versus fixed returns. Hence, the investment selection committee may choose to 
increase their risk tolerance and allocate more to equities with hopes to achieve a higher return. This 
action along with the ability to make timely ARC payments could help reduce the ULG.  
 Model Results-Assumed Discount Rate 
The assumed investment return (commonly referred to as the discount rate) is important when 
determining an effective investment strategy for public pension plans (Fig. 3). The discount rate is used to 
value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by estimating expected rates of 
return. This rate is a function of the risk-free interest rate plus the risk premium associated with public 
plans not being able to pay their pension obligation and should reflect the risk of the pension liabilities 
(Bui and Randazzo, 2015). The public plan aggregated data across the U.S., shows an average assumed 
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discount rate of approximately 7.79% from 2003-2018. However, rates used by plans, may vary across 
the country. For example, according to the PPD, the Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System 
reported discount rates of 8.50%, 8.25% and 8.00% respectively from 2016-2018.  
This shows a slight reduction in its discount rate over three consecutive years. The Connecticut State 
Employees Retirement System used a lower rate of 6.90% from 2016 through 2018. Wisconsin, a 100% 
funded ratio (considered a fully funded plan20) shows a discount rate of 7.2%, 7.2% and 7.0% from the 
same period (2016-2018). Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System, also 100% funded according to 
the Pension data, uses a discount rate of 5.5%, 5.25% and 5.25% from 2016-2018. 
Josh Rauh, chief economist at Stanford Graduate School of Business, states that public pension plans are 
using an assumed discount rate that is too high. Rauh (2016) suggests a lower rate be used which would 
mean that more money would need to be contributed now to support pension benefits that will be paid out 
in the future. Some critics argue that by using an interest rate that is unreasonably low makes pension 
funds worse than they are (Bond, Tyler, 2016). The use of a higher assumed investment return would 
result in a higher present value of future payments of pension benefits. Fig. 3 compares the assumed 
investment return known as the discount rate to the actual average 10- year return. The average 10-year 
return and the discount rate represent aggregated plans used in the dataset from 2003-2018. The discount 
rate shows a consistent average of 7.8% vs. the average10-year return of 6.8%.  
A uniform and consistent proxy such as 10-year Treasury notes, 30-year bonds or high-grade municipal 
bonds should be set as a standard for calculation of the assumed investment return. The rates would be 
lower and may have a more realistic asset value than the assumed discount rate disclosed in the data 
provided. Persistent testing of the discount rate shows a larger reduction of the UL without a lag than with 
a two-year lag. Results reveal that a 1% increase in the discount rate will reduce the UL by 14% with a no 
lag (Table 3C). This is a significant drop to the UL and the reduction will help to close the UL gap. It may 
also explain that higher assumed investment returns reported by plan actuaries could result in a lower UL. 
When evaluated with other statistically significant variables with one and two-year lags, findings show 
that the one-year lag result was not statistically significant. However, the two- year lag reveals that a 1% 
increase in the discount rate will cause the UL to fall by 3.68% with a two-year lag (Table 4A). The 
results are statistically highly significant. To put it in further context, if the discount rate increases by 1%, 
                                                          
20 According to Florida Public Pension Trustees Association (FPPTA) a plan is considered fully funded if its assets exceed 
liabilities, Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded Liability.” 
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the 2018 total aggregated UL of $1.40T would see a reduction of $51.5B (resulting in a net UL of 
approximately $1.35T). 
Endogeneity 
Two methods were executed to rule out endogeneity assumptions. The Wald Test was performed as a 
joint significant test, and a lag identification approach was also used. The model was evaluated to see 
whether all coefficients were equal to zero. The Wald Test concludes that joint coefficients are not equal 
to 0 and that we can reject the null hypothesis. Table 4B shows us results that are highly statistically for 
all seven independent variables. Therefore, we conclude that the model has predictive power where at 
least one of the independent variables would help to predict our dependent variable. 
 
A one- and two-year lagging approach was also assessed for all statistically significant variables and are 
shown in Table 4A. These strategies were chosen to help alleviate threats to causal identification without 
the need to use any other data than what is available in the data set.  
Conclusion 
One of the biggest financial concerns within the public and private retirement plan landscape is the ability 
to pay out guaranteed lifetime pension obligations for current and future employees. To determine the 
magnitude of the obligation, the UL (assets minus liabilities) was selected as the dependent variable and 
measured against several variables grouped in three categories that included contributions, economic 
methods, and investment strategy.  
Results conclude that three of the fifteen predictor variables could help close the ULG. These variables 
include the discount rate, avg 10-year returns and equity allocation on an aggregated statewide plan basis. 
As pointed out during data analysis, other proxies such as 10-year Treasury notes, 30-year bonds or high-
grade municipal bonds should be set as a standard for calculation of the assumed investment return known 
as the discount rate. Additionally, an investment policy statement that outlines the most optimal asset 
allocation strategy should be reviewed each year. Standard risk tolerance questions should be answered 
and documented during the plan annual review the results should help develop the right asset mix of 
equities and fixed income investments for the plan.  
Results also reveals an increase to the UL when ARC increases by 1%. In order to reverse the increase, it 
is my recommendation that the ARC payment by the employer be required, not optional. This approach 
will ensure that full payments are made and in a timely manner. There should also be legal ramifications 
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levied if the employer does not pay on a timely basis. In the public sector, there may be political 
resistance to amend the contribution requirements. However, this may be the right season (post-Covid 19) 
for politics to be set aside as many public employers simply do not have enough funds to cover its 
liabilities. Another finding shows that, employees contributions added to the total ARC payment made by 
the employer, the UL begins to slightly reduce. Public plans may consider a plan design that require an 
employee contribution.  
The private and public sectors of DB plans are faced with three main risks. The private sector established 
rules and regulations (ERISA) to deal with these concerns and help to mitigate these risks. However, the 
public sector has not addressed these concerns through a formal mandate such as ERISA. ERISA-like 
rules and regulations should be introduced in the public sector to address the issue of compliance. There 
are currently no minimum pension plan funding requirements for public plans in the U.S. and therefore 
the ARC payment should no longer be an optional payment. Additionally, there is currently no external 
insurance or pension guarantee fund for DB public plans. Insurance should be required for public plans 
like the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that exists today for private DB 
plans which protects plan benefits up to statutory limits. A statutory lien should be enforced if an 
employer has not made requirement minimum contributions and unpaid amounts total more than a certain 
dollar threshold. Premiums should be financed by tax revenue to provide protection should the 
employer become unable to continue the plan. This type of benefit security is necessary as public plans 
seek to protect their employees (plan members). Also, there should be minimum reporting requirements 
for public pension plans to an entity such as PBGC that can update plan participants about insurance 
risks. One suggestion would be that underfunded plans (i.e., below 80% funded ratio) should be closely 
monitored and expected to report plan statistics more frequently than those that are adequately funded.  
Being transparent is another essential area of improvement in the public sector, oftentimes employees are 
not informed of the status (i.e., funding status, investment strategy, etc.) of DB plans. There has been a 
shift as noted earlier that DB public plans are no longer solely investing in fixed income investments, but 
across multiple asset classes. It is important to provide employees with specifics of the plan and its 
inherent risks. One way is to require annual group meetings with employees to review pension plan 
status. An annual plan disclosure and or other plan communication materials should be supplied to all DB 
participants within the public sector.  
Both financial measures and plan design play a critical role in finding ways to reduce the UL. Further 
research can be conducted on testing other proxies such as 10-year Treasury notes, 30-year bonds or high-
grade municipal bonds to be used as best practice when calculating the assumed investment return. 
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Additionally, emphasis was placed on the testing of multiple financial determinants throughout this paper.  
Any suggested changes to the annual required contribution (ARC) can be considered a modification to the 
plan design. However, research to evaluate and determine the impact of other potential plan design 
changes (such as age, years of service, average salary, service credits) would be a beneficial next step for 
this study.   





Please note that Table 3 in listed in the introduction session  
 
Table 2 
To compute the approximate annual benefit, multiply the average of the highest 3 years (30 months) of 
paid salaries in Connecticut public schools by the appropriate percentage. The percentage shown are 
estimated based on full-time credited teaching service. Percentage will be lower for part-time employees. 
The minimum qualifications for retirement are:  25 years credited service at any age (20 in CT), or 20 
years credited service at age 55 (15 in CT) or 10 years of credited service at age 60 (10 in CT).21 
Retirement Percentage Chart21 
(Connecticut public schools) 
 
AGE 20 YRS 21 YRS 22 YRS 23 YRS 24 YRS 
 
25 YRS 
55 28.00% 29.40% 30.80% 32.20% 33.60% 
 
35.00% 
56 30.40% 31.92% 33.44% 34.96% 36.48% 38.00% 
57 32.80% 34.44% 36.08% 37.72% 39.36% 41.00% 
58 35.20% 36.96% 38.72% 40.48% 42.24% 44.00% 
59 37.60% 39.48% 41.36% 43.24% 45.12% 47.00% 
60 40.00% 42.00% 44.00% 46.00% 48.00% 50.00% 
 
Resign at age 60 or Older 10 YRS 15 YRS 20 YRS 
Percentage 10.00% 22.50% 40.00% 
 
Table 3 
Please note that Table 3 in listed in the Empirical Model session   
                                                          
21 CT official State Website, https://portal.ct.gov/TRB, CT Teacher’s Retirement Board, Benefit Estimator. 




Table 3A:  Unfunded Liability as a function of all selected independent variables 
Multiple OLS Regression 
Panel Data:  Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed 



























ARCR -.5500 0.0602 * [-1.8801] 0.2925 
44.3990 0.7672 ARCR_ER 2.0780 0.0000 
**** [4.7552] 0.4369  




State Financial  
Levers 
(Balanced) 
TAXRPC 1.2200 0.0002 **** [3.7218] 3.2800 
34.4427 0.7214 
GPERC -6.7100 0.6737 N/A [-0.4211] 1.5900 
















































































EQRTN -0.0082 0.9034 N/A [-0.1213] 0.0682 
FIRTN 0.3370 0.0561 * [1.9120] 0.1762 
A3YR 0.0008 0.9977 N/A [0.2999] 0.0029 
A5YR -0.5791 0.0669 * [-1.8336] 0.3158 
A10YR 































   
****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects 
Table 3A shows results for all selected independent variables (15-variable linear regression). The independent 
variables are shown in five groups – two groups of balanced data and three groups of unbalanced panel data. Results 
are shown for beta, probability, T-stats, standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 based on author’s estimation. 
  
 Which Financial Measures Can Be Leveraged To Help Close The Unfunded Liability Gap For State Pension Plans?  26 
 
 
Table 3B:  Unfunded Liability as a function of the Optimal Independent Variables (No Lag) 
Panel Data:  Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed 






















Group 1 ARCR -0.5171 0.0670 * [-1.8285] 0.2828 
44.2005 0.7686 ARCR_ER 2.0101 0.0000 **** [4.8434] 0.4150 
TAXRPC 1.1400 0.0001 **** [3.8274] 2.9800 








FIRTN 0.2797 0.0549 * [1.9211] 0.1456 
30.7049 0.7541 A10YR -2.6064 0.0007 **** [-3.3823] 0.7706 
EQTALL -0.1881 0.0539 * [-1.9294] 0.0974    
****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects 
 
 
Table 3B displays panel data that represent independent variables that were statistically significant (7-variables) in 
both the balanced and unbalanced group. The discount rate variable, although not significant at this stage is also 
shown. The five groups as shown in 3A were condensed two groups displayed in Table 3B. Result shown for beta, 




Table 3C:  Unfunded Liability as a function of the Optimal Independent Variables- (No Lag) 
Panel Data:  Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed 
Optimization of Multiple OLS Regressions- Explained Variables  
One Group:  Combined Balanced and Unbalanced  























ARCR -0.5171 0.2558 N/A [-1.1367] 0.4512 
42.5630 0.832 
ARCR_ER 1.9454 0.0011 **** [3.2831] 0.5925 
TAXRPC 2.5800 0.0004 **** [3.5326] 7.2900 









FIRTN 0.2536 0.0328 ** [2.1371] 0.1186 
A10YR -1.7051 0.0032 **** [-2.9525] 0.5775 
EQTALL -0.0360 0.6757 N/A [-0.4183] 0.0860    
****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects 
Table 3C combines the balanced and unbalanced variables of panel data from 3B into one group. The discount rate 
variable now displays a reduction in the unfunded liability as statistically significant, while ARCR (Employee and 
Employer annual required contribution) and EQTALL (equity allocation) are no longer significant. Results shown 
for beta, probability, T-stats, standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 are based on author’s estimation. 
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Table 4A:  Unfunded Liability as a function of the Optimal Independent Variables  
(Lagged One-Year and Two -Year Balanced and Unbalanced Groups as shown in Table 3B) 
Panel Data:  Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed 













































































































































****p<0.001 ;***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects 
 
Using data as shown in Table 3B, this table displays the variable results with a one- and two-year lag. Two groups 
are shown in Table 4. The results show that the Employer annual contribution rate (ARCR_ER) is highly 
statistically significant, two-year lag on discount rate (DISCR) shows statically significant and the one- year lag on 
the 10 year (A10YR) is even more robust when results are lagged. Results shown for beta, probability, T-stats, 
standard errors, weighted F-statistic and R2 are based on author’s estimation. 
 
  





Table 4B:  Walt Test [Joint Significance Test]- No Lag 
Panel Data:  Cross-section Data is Fixed/Period is Fixed 
One Group:  Combined Balanced and Unbalanced 

















ARCR_ER  1.9379 0.5925 **** 
TAXRPC 2.540 7.2900 **** 
DISCR -14.3630 5.2120 **** 
FIRTN 0.2536 0.1186 **** 
A10YR -1.7051 0.5775 **** 
EQTALL -0.0361 0.0860 **** 
    
 
****p<0.001; ***.001<p<0.01; **0.01<p<0.05, *0.05<p<0.10, level of significance of effects 
 
The model was evaluated to see whether all coefficients were equal to zero. Results were highly significant, and we conclude that 
the model has predictive power where at least one of the independent variables (X) help to predict our dependent variable (Y). 
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Fig. 1  
 
 
Fig. 1 displays the total aggregated unfunded liability which is the dependent variable. The total value vs. the 
unfunded liability as a percentage of assets from 2003-2018 is shown. The panel model was adjusted to reflect those 
plans that reported PPD data during 2003-2018. 
Fig. 2
 
Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of the average 10-year return of all aggregated plans used in the dataset from 2003-2018. 
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Fig. 3 shows the assumed investment return known as the discount rate vs. the actual average 10- year return. This 
discount rate is used to value the current cost of future pension obligations and is determined by estimating expected 
rates of return on all aggregated plans in dataset from 2003-2018. The average 10-year return is the return of all 
aggregated plans used in the dataset from 2003-2018. The discount rate shows a consistent average of 7.8% vs. the 
average10-year return of 6.8%.  
Fig. 4 
Fig. 4 shows the Annual Required Contribution by the employer [ARCR_ER] and the Annual Required 
Contribution by both the employee and the employer [ARCR] from 2003-2018. Note that 2003 shows the lowest 
total contributions of 26% of payroll and 2017 shows the highest at 50% of payroll. These numbers are shown as a 
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Fig. 5 shows the equity, fixed and other allocations (real estate, alternatives, private equities, commodities, cash, and 
other asset classes) aggregated by all plans used in dataset over the 16-year period. Note that there is higher 
percentage of equity allocation to fixed income allocation over each of the 16 years. Excluding 2008, assets were 
also allocated to real estate, alternatives, private equities, commodities, and cash. The 2008 allocation shows that the 
financial crisis has impacted the allocation choices of many of the public pension plans across the U.S. Overall, the 
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Fig. 6 shows both equity and fixed returns aggregated by all plans used in PPD dataset from 2003-2018. Note that 
the 2008 allocation to equities and fixed income as shown on Fig. 5 is 60.8% and 39.3% respectively and generated 
a negative return of 17.0% as shown in Fig 6. Additionally, the 2009 allocation to equities and fixed income as 
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1 
    
Plan ID 
State 
ABBR Plan Name Plan Full Name  
1 AL Alabama ERS Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama 
2 AL Alabama Teachers Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama 
3 AK Alaska PERS State of Alaska Public Employees’ Retirement System 
4 AK Alaska Teachers State of Alaska Teachers’ Retirement System 
5 AZ Arizona Public Safety Arizona Public Safety Personnel Retirement System 
6 AZ Arizona SRS Arizona State Retirement System 
94 AZ Phoenix ERS Phoenix Employees' Retirement System 
127 AZ Arizona State Corrections Officers Arizona State Corrections Officers Retirement Plan 
176 AZ Tucson Supplemental RS Tucson Supplemental Retirement System 
7 AR Arkansas PERS Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System 
8 AR Arkansas Teachers Arkansas Teacher Retirement System 
9 CA California PERF California Public Employees Retirement Fund 
10 CA California Teachers California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
18 CA Contra Costa County Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association 
43 CA LA County ERS Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association 
97 CA San Diego County San Diego County Employees Retirement Association 
98 CA San Francisco City & County San Francisco City & County Employees' Retirement System 
111 CA University of California University of California Retirement Plan 
137 CA Alameda County ERS Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association 
138 CA Kern County ERS Kern County Employees' Retirement Association 
139 CA Los Angeles ERS Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System 
140 CA Los Angeles Fire and Police Los Angeles City Fire and Police Pension System 
141 CA Los Angeles Water and Power Los Angeles Water and Power Employees' Retirement Plan 
142 CA Orange County ERS Orange County Employees Retirement System 
143 CA Sacramento County ERS Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System 
144 CA San Diego City ERS San Diego City Employees' Retirement System 
13 CO Colorado Municipal Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-Local Division 
14 CO Colorado School Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-School Division 
15 CO Colorado State Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-State Division 
22 CO Denver Employees Denver Employees Retirement Plan 
23 CO Denver Schools Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association-Denver Public Schools Division 
16 CT Connecticut SERS Connecticut State Employees Retirement System 
17 CT Connecticut Teachers Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System 
128 CT Connecticut Municipal Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System 
21 DE Delaware State Employees Delaware State Employees' Pension Plan 
195 DE 
Delaware County and Municipal 
Employees Delaware County and Municipal Other Employees 
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FL Florida RS Florida Retirement System 
27 GA Georgia ERS Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia 
28 GA Georgia Teachers Teachers Retirement System of Georgia 
161 GA Atlanta ERS Atlanta General Employees' Pension Fund 
29 HI Hawaii ERS Employees’ Retirement System of the State of Hawaii 
31 ID Idaho PERS Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho 
11 IL Chicago Teachers Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago 
32 IL Illinois Municipal Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund 
33 IL Illinois SERS State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois 
34 IL Illinois Teachers Teachers' Retirement System of The State of Illinois 
35 IL Illinois Universities State Universities Retirement System of Illinois 
145 IL Chicago Municipal Chicago Municipal Employees' Annuity Benefit Fund 
36 IN Indiana PERF State of Indiana Public Employees' Retirement Fund 
37 IN Indiana Teachers Indiana State Teachers’ Retirement Fund 
38 IA Iowa PERS Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System 
129 IA Iowa Municipal Fire and Police Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa 
39 KS Kansas PERS Kansas Public Employees Retirement System 
179 KS Wichita ERS Wichita Employees' Retirement System 
40 KY Kentucky County County Employees Retirement System of Kentucky 
41 KY Kentucky ERS Kentucky Employees Retirement System 
42 KY Kentucky Teachers Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Kentucky 
44 LA Louisiana SERS Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System 
45 LA Louisiana Teachers Louisiana State Teachers Retirement System 
163 LA Baton Rouge City Parish RS Baton Rouge City Parish Employees' Retirement System 
197 LA Louisiana Municipal Employees Louisiana Municipal Employees 
46 ME Maine Local Maine Public Employees Retirement System - Participating Local Districts 
47 ME Maine State and Teacher Maine Public Employees Retirement System - State and Teacher Retirement Program 
48 MD Maryland PERS Maryland State Retirement and Pension System - Employees Combined System 
49 MD Maryland Teachers Maryland State Retirement and Pension System - Teachers Combined System 
155 MD Baltimore Fire and Police Baltimore Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System 
50 MA Massachusetts SRS Massachusetts State Retirement System 
51 MA Massachusetts Teachers Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System 
52 MI Michigan Municipal Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Michigan 
53 MI Michigan Public Schools Michigan Public School Employees’ Retirement System 
54 MI Michigan SERS Michigan State Employees’ Retirement System 
57 MN Minnesota State Employees Minnesota State Employees Retirement Fund 
58 MN Minnesota Teachers Teachers Retirement Association of Minnesota 
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ABBR Plan Name Plan Full Name  
103 MN St. Paul Teachers St. Paul Teachers Retirement Fund 
133 MN Minnesota Police and Fire Minnesota Public Employees Police & Fire Plan 
59 MS Mississippi PERS Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi 
60 MO Missouri DOT and Highway Missouri Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol Employees' Retirement Syst 
61 MO Missouri Local Missouri Local Government Employees Retirement System 
62 MO Missouri PEERS Public Education Employee Retirement System of Missouri 
63 MO Missouri State Employees Missouri State Employees’ Retirement System 
64 MO Missouri Teachers Public School Retirement System of Missouri 
102 MO St. Louis School Employees Public School Retirement System of the City of St. Louis 
65 MT Montana PERS Montana Public Employees' Retirement System 
66 MT Montana Teachers Teachers' Retirement System of Montana 
162 NE Omaha School Omaha School Employees' Retirement System 
203 NE Omaha ERS Omaha City Employees Retirement System 
68 NV 
Nevada Police Officer and 
Firefighter Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada - Police and Firefighters Plan 
69 NV Nevada Regular Employees Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada - Regular Employees Plan 




Contributory Retirement System Manchester Employees' Contributory Retirement System 
71 NJ New Jersey PERS Public Employees’ Retirement System of New Jersey 
72 NJ New Jersey Police & Fire The Police and Firemen’s Retirement System of New Jersey 
73 NJ New Jersey Teachers Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund of New Jersey 
202 NJ 
 
Jersey City Municipal Employees 
Pension Fund Jersey City Municipal Employees Pension Fund 
74 NM New Mexico PERA Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico 
75 NM New Mexico Educational Educational Retirement Board of New Mexico 
76 NY New York City ERS New York City Employees' Retirement System 
77 NY New York City Teachers Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York 
78 NY New York State Teachers New York State Teachers’ Retirement System 
83 NY NY State & Local ERS New York State and Local Retirement System - Employees’ Retirement System 
84 NY NY State & Local Police & Fire New York State and Local Retirement System - Police and Fire Retirement System 
79 NC North Carolina Local Government North Carolina Local Governmental Employees’ Retirement System 
80 NC 
North Carolina Teachers and State 
Employees Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System of North Carolina 
182 NC Charlotte Firefighters' RS Charlotte Firefighters' Retirement System 
81 ND North Dakota PERS North Dakota Public Employees Retirement System 
82 ND North Dakota Teachers North Dakota Teachers' Fund for Retirement 
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List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1 
 
Plan ID State 
ABBR 
Plan Name Plan Full Name 
85 OH Ohio PERS Ohio Public Employees Retirement System 
86 OH Ohio Police & Fire Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund 
87 OH Ohio School Employees School Employees’ Retirement System of Ohio 
88 OH Ohio Teachers School Employees’ Retirement System of Ohio 
160 OH Cincinnati ERS Cincinnati Employees' Retirement System 
89 OK Oklahoma PERS Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System 
90 OK Oklahoma Teachers Teachers' Retirement System of Oklahoma 
134 OK Oklahoma Police Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System 
91 OR Oregon PERS Oregon Public Employees Retirement System 
92 PA Pennsylvania School Employees Public School Employees’ Retirement System of Pennsylvania 
93 PA Pennsylvania State ERS Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System 
136 PA Pennsylvania Municipal Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System 
152 PA Philadelphia Municipal Philadelphia Municipal Retirement System 
95 RI Rhode Island ERS Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island 
96 RI Rhode Island Municipal Rhode Island Municipal Employees’ Retirement System 
99 SC South Carolina Police South Carolina Police Officers Retirement System 
100 SC South Carolina RS South Carolina Retirement System 
101 SD South Dakota RS South Dakota Retirement System 
109 TN TN Political Subdivisions Tennessee Political Subdivisions Retirement Plan 
110 TN TN State and Teachers Tennessee State and Teachers' Retirement Plan 
158 TN Nashville-Davidson ERS Nashville Davidson Metropolitan Employee Benefit System 
12 TX Austin ERS City of Austin Employees' Retirement System 
104 TX Texas County & District Texas County & District Retirement System 
105 TX Texas ERS Employees Retirement System of Texas 
106 TX Texas LECOS Texas Law Enforcement and Custodial Officer Supplemental Retirement Fund 
107 TX Texas Municipal Texas Municipal Retirement System 
108 TX Texas Teachers Teacher Retirement System of Texas 
201 TX Dallas ERS Dallas Employees Retirement System 
204 TX Houston Municipal Houston Municipal Employees Retirement Fund 
112 UT Utah Noncontributory Utah Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System 
135 UT Utah Public Safety Utah Public Safety and Firefighter Retirement Plan 
113 VT Vermont State Employees Vermont State Employees' Retirement System 
114 VT Vermont Teachers State Teachers' Retirement System of Vermont 
199 VT Vermont Municipal Employees Vermont Municipal Employees 
25 VA Fairfax County Schools Educational Employees’ Supplementary Retirement System of Fairfax County 
115 VA Virginia RS Virginia Retirement System 
117 WA Washington LEOFF Plan 2 Washington Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters Plan 2 




Washington School Employees 
Pl  2/3 
 
 
Washington School Employees Plan 2 
  





List of U.S. Public Plans included in analysis1 
 
 
Plan ID State 
ABBR 
Plan Name Plan Full Name 
122 WA Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 
123 WV West Virginia PERS West Virginia Public Employees’ Retirement System 
124 WV West Virginia Teachers West Virginia Teachers’ Retirement System 
125 WI Wisconsin RS Wisconsin Retirement System 
151 WI Milwaukee City ERS Milwaukee City Employees' Retirement System 
























1 Public Plan Database (PPD) (2019) Public plans data. Available at https://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database, Google 
Scholar. 




1. Broadbent, John, et al. The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution Pension Plans - 
Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Management. Dec. 2006, p. 55. 
2. “2010 Comparative Study of Major Public Retirement Systems.” Wisconsin Legislative Council., 
2012 2011, p. 42. 
3. Annual Survey of State Government Finances Tables. United States Census Bureau, 8 Oct. 2021. 
4. Antolin, Pablo. “Pension Fund Performance.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008. DOI.org 
(Crossref), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1368816. 
5. Ashford, Kate, and John Schmidt. “Understanding Defined Benefit Pension Plans.” 
Understanding Defined Benefit Pension Plans, Forbes Advisor, 5 Oct. 2021, 
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/retirement/what-is-a-defined-benefit-plan/. 
6. Bagchi, Sutirtha. “The Effects of Political Competition on the Generosity of Public-Sector 
Pension Plans.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 164, Aug. 2019, pp. 439–68. 
DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.014. 
7. Beshears, John, et al. “Behavioral Economics Perspectives on Public Sector Pension Plans.” 
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, vol. 10, no. 2, Apr. 2011, pp. 315–36. DOI.org 
(Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474747211000114. 
8. Blake, David, et al. “Asset Allocation Dynamics and Pension Fund Performance.” The Journal of 
Business, vol. 72, no. 4, 1999, pp. 429–61. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.1086/209623. 
9. Bond, Tyler. “What Is a Discount Rate and Why Does It Matter?” What Is a Discount Rate and 
Why Does It Matter? National Public Pension Coalition, 19 Apr. 2016, 
https://protectpensions.org/2016/04/19/discount-rate-matter/. 
10. Brainard and Brown, Keith, Alex. The Annual Required Contribution Experience of State 
Retirement Plans, FY 01 to FY 13. 2015. 
11. Brown, Jeffrey, Robert Clark and Joshua Rauh. “Behavioral Economics Perspective on Public 
Sector Pension Plans”. January 2011. 
12. Bui, Truong, and Anthony Randazzo. “Why Discount Rates Should Reflect Liabilities:  Best 
Practices for Setting Public Sector Pension Fund Discount Rates.” Reason, vol. Policy Brief No 
130, Sept. 2015, p. 22. 
13. Bureau of Economic Analysis- Real Gross Domestic Product Annual by State 2003-2018; Used 
for Economic Measures, GDP per Capita. 
14. “Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding and the Role of Actuaries.” PEBC Educational 
Monograph, 2018. 
 Which Financial Measures Can Be Leveraged To Help Close The Unfunded Liability Gap For State Pension Plans?  39 
 
 
15. Draine, David, “How Pandemic-Driven Revenue Shortfalls Could Affect State Pension 
Contributions.” Press Release Point, PEW, 2021, https://www.pressreleasepoint.com/how-
pandemic-driven-revenue-shortfalls-could-affect-state-pension-contributions. 
16. Dulebohn, James H. “An Investigation of the Determinants of Investment Risk Behavior in 
Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans.” Journal of Management, vol. 28, no. 1, Feb. 2002, pp. 
3–26. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1177/014920630202800102. 
17. Enright, Mike. “Understanding Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans.” Understanding 
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, Wolters Kluwer, 10 Feb. 2021, 
https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/understanding-defined-benefit-and-defined-
contribution-plans.  
18. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income & 
Product Accounts; Real Gross Domestic Product, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
www.fred.stlouis.org/series/GDPC1, updated October 28, 2021. 
19. International Actuarial Association. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding and the Role of 
Actuaries, May 2018. 
20. Investment Company Institute (U.S.). 2020 Investment Company Fact Book: A Review of Trends 
and Activities in the Investment Company Industry. 2020. 
21. Longley, Robert. “The Reconstruction ERA 1863-1877.” Thought.Com, Oct. 2020. 
22. Marshall, S. Brooks. “Asset Allocation Dynamics and Pension Fund Performance.” CFA Digest, 
vol. 30, no. 2, May 2000, pp. 38–40. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.2469/dig.v30.n2.665. 
23. Mohan, Nancy, and Ting Zhang. “An Analysis of Risk-Taking Behavior for Public Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans.” Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 40, Mar. 2014, pp. 403–19. DOI.org 
(Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.011. 
24. Morrin, Maureen, et al. “Fund Assortments, Gender, and Retirement Plan Participation.” 
International Journal of Bank Marketing, vol. 29, no. 5, July 2011, pp. 433–50. DOI.org 
(Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1108/02652321111152927. 
25. Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua D. Rauh. “The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension 
Plans.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 4, Nov. 2009, pp. 191–210. DOI.org 
(Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.23.4.191. 
26. Phipps, Melissa. “The History,” The History of Pension Plans in the U.S., vol. The Balance. 
27. Public Plan Data Contains Detailed Annual Data on the Largest State/Local Pension Plans in the 
U.S. and Is Produced by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR) and the 
Center for State and Local Government Excellence (SLGE). 
28. State Public Pension Investments Shift Over Past 30 Years. The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014. 
 Which Financial Measures Can Be Leveraged To Help Close The Unfunded Liability Gap For State Pension Plans?  40 
 
 
29. State and Local Governments Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). U.S Department of 
Wage and Labor division, March 2011, www.dol.gov, 2020. 
30. St. Clair, Travis. “The Impact of Budget Stabilization Funds on State Pension Contributions: 
Impact of Budget Stabilization Funds.” Public Budgeting & Finance, vol. 33, no. 3, Sept. 2013, 
pp. 55–74. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12014.x. 
31. Topoleski, John, and Elizabeth Myers. Single-Employer Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Funding 
Relief and Modifications to Funding Rules. Congressional Research Service, R46366, May 2020. 
32. “Understanding Public Pension Plan’s Unfunded Liability.” Florida Public Pension Trustees 
Association (FPPTA), p. 1-8. 
33. United States Census Bureau -Annual Survey of State Government Finances Tables 2003-2018 – 
Revenue and Expense Data by State. 
34. Woodward, Richard, The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). 
Routledge, 2009. 
35. Wooten, James A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Political History. 
University of California Press; Milbank Memorial Fund; Employee Benefit Research Institute, 
2004. 
